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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Norman Shelton appeals the district court’s denial of 
class certification and grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendants on Shelton’s claims for alleged violations of the 
Eighth Amendment and the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”).  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the 
order denying class certification and granting summary 
judgment to defendants on Shelton’s Eighth Amendment 
claim.  We will affirm the district court’s dismissal of 
Shelton’s FTCA claim. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Special Management Unit, or “SMU,” is a 
housing unit within the United States Penitentiary at 
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”).  The SMU 
houses inmates who have been identified as having violent 
tendencies or who have a history of gang involvement during 
their incarceration.  Inmates assigned to the SMU are 
confined to their cells for 23 hours a day, but they can spend 
the remaining hour in a recreation cage if they choose.  SMU 
officials (including several of the defendants) are responsible 
for assigning cellmates in a manner that ensures the safety 
and security of the prison.  When first assigned to the SMU, 
inmates are interviewed by prison officials.  Information 
obtained during the interview is used to ensure that inmates 
who may be hostile to each other are not housed in the same 
cell. 
 
Shelton, an inmate at USP-Lewisburg, brought this 
action on behalf of himself and other inmates housed in the 
SMU.  He alleges that the defendants have engaged in a 
pattern, practice, or policy of improperly placing inmates who 
are known to be hostile to each other in the same cell.  He 
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also claims that the defendants fail to intervene when the 
predictable inmate-on-inmate violence erupts, and that 
defendants improperly restrain inmates who refuse cell 
assignments with inmates who are known to be hostile to 
them.  The complaint seeks damages for Shelton personally, 
but it seeks only injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of 
the class.  Appendix (“A A.”) 88-89. 
  
 Shelton’s individual claims under the Eighth 
Amendment and the FTCA were initially based on two 
separate incidents in 2009, one of which occurred in August, 
and the other in November.  However, Shelton voluntarily 
dismissed claims arising from the August incident.  We are 
therefore only concerned with the November incident, which 
occurred when Shelton was scheduled to be moved to another 
cell and housed with an inmate named Carr.  According to 
Shelton, Carr had previously told a prison official, defendant 
Raup, that he would attack Shelton if they were housed in the 
same cell.  
 
Raup purportedly threatened Shelton with punitive 
restraints when Shelton asked not to be housed with Carr.  
Shelton alleges that he was nevertheless physically forced 
into the cell by defendants Raup, Zelder, and two John Doe 
corrections officers.  The next day, while Shelton was 
bending over to retrieve a food tray, Carr purportedly 
assaulted him.  Shelton alleges that defendants Fisher, Raup, 
Kulago, Zelder, Moffit and Combe were outside his cell 
during the attack but did not attempt to intervene.  The 
defendants claim that they responded in accordance with 
applicable policies that are designed to protect both inmates 
and guards. 
 
Shelton’s Eighth Amendment claims on behalf of the 
class are based on allegations that prison officials improperly 
placed inmates in cells with inmates known to be hostile to 
them.  He alleges that the committee that makes the cell 
assignments places hostile inmates in the same cell despite 
committee’s knowledge of prior violence between the inmates 
and its knowledge of the obvious risk the cell assignments 
create.  According to Shelton, the injurious effects of this 
practice are exacerbated by a prison policy which prevents 
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guards from promptly intervening when inmate-on-inmate 
violence erupts.  This policy purportedly requires corrections 
officers to stand outside a cell and use only verbal warnings 
until a lieutenant arrives when inmate violence erupts inside a 
cell.  
 
Shelton defined the class for which he sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief as:  
[a]ll persons who are currently or will be 
imprisoned in the SMU program at USP 
Lewisburg.  The class period commences from 
the time of this filing, and continues so long as 
USP Lewisburg Officials and Corrections 
Officers persist in the unconstitutional patterns, 
practices, or policies of (1) placing hostile 
inmates together in cells or recreation cages, 
and enforcing this placement through the use of 
punitive restraints, and (2) failing to take any 
reasonable measures to protect the inmates from 
inmate-on-inmate violence by hostile inmates. 
 
A A. 77 (Compl. ¶ 119). 
 
Shelton filed his motion for class certification 90 days 
after he filed the complaint, as required by Local Rule 23.3.  
Defendants responded by opposing class certification and 
asking the district court to dismiss the claims or grant 
summary judgment in their favor.  No discovery requests 
were filed by either party; no disclosures were provided; and 
no discovery occurred.  However, Shelton filed a brief 
opposing summary judgment, and he attached a Rule 56(d) 
declaration to that brief.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).  The 
declaration stated that counsel needed discovery in order to 
properly respond to the defendants’ motions.    
 
As we noted at the outset, the district court denied 
Shelton’s motion for class certification and granted 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  The court did so 
without first addressing Shelton’s Rule 56(d) declaration.  
This appeal followed. 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
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U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction to review final 
decisions of a district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review rulings on class certification for abuse of discretion.  
A court abuses its discretion “if [its] decision rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law 
or an improper application of law to fact.”  Hayes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 354 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Our review of the 
district court’s legal rulings is de novo.  Id.  
 
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the 
moving party must demonstrate “that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we assess the record 
using the same standard that district courts apply.  Interstate 
Outdoor Adver., L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Twp. of Mount Laurel, 
706 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 2013).  We must review the record 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw 
all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  Id. 
 
We review the district court’s response to a Rule 56(d) 
declaration for abuse of discretion.  Murphy v. Millennium 
Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 310 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
III. CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 
 Class actions are an exception to the general rule that 
litigation must be conducted by individual named parties.  See 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).  
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains the 
procedural requirements for class action litigation.  A party 
seeking to bring a class action “must affirmatively 
demonstrate his[or her] compliance” with Rule 23.  Id.  An 
inquiry under Rule 23 begins with a determination of whether 
the plaintiff has satisfied the prerequisites of Rule 23(a): 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of the 
class representative.  Depending on the type of class the 
movant seeks to certify, s/he must also demonstrate that the 
class meets certain requirements of Rule 23(b).  
 
 Shelton asked the court to certify a class under Rule 
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23(b)(2), which applies when “the party opposing the class 
has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to 
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a 
whole.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).  The district court did not 
analyze the specific requirements of Rule 23(a) or Rule 
23(b)(2).  Instead, it denied Shelton’s motion for class 
certification because it found that the proposed class was not 
“objectively, reasonably ascertainable.”  Shelton v. Bledsoe, 
No. 3:CV-11-1618, 2012 WL 5250401, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 
24, 2012).  
  
 Because we have not yet addressed the issue, this 
appeal requires us to decide whether ascertainability is a 
requirement for certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class that 
seeks only injunctive and declaratory relief.  We must also 
address the question of whether the district court properly 
defined the class in analyzing whether class certification was 
appropriate. 
 
A. Ascertainability 
 
 The word “ascertainable” does not appear in the text of 
Rule 23.  However, “[a]lthough not specifically mentioned in 
the rule, an essential prerequisite of an action under Rule 23 
is that there must be a ‘class.’”  7A C. Wright, A. Miller, & 
M. Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1760 (3d ed. 2005).  
Courts have generally articulated this “essential prerequisite” 
as the implied requirement of “ascertainability”—that the 
members of a class are identifiable at the moment of 
certification.  Because the question is intensely fact-specific 
and the origins of the requirement murky, a precise definition 
of the judicially-created requirement of ascertainability is 
elusive.  See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 
F.2d 975, 980 n.6 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that “[i]t is not clear 
whether the source of th[e] implied requirement [of 
ascertainability] is . . . Rule 23(a)(2) or more simply 
something inherent in the very notion of a ‘class’”).  We 
recently held, in the context of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, 
that certification is only appropriate if the members of the 
class are “currently and readily ascertainable based on 
objective criteria.”  Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 
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583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
 In Marcus, we analyzed the question of 
ascertainability separately from the question of whether the 
class was properly defined under Rule 23(c)(1)(B).  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B) (“An order that certifies a class action 
must define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses 
. . . .”).1  We have interpreted Rule 23(c)(1)(B) to require a 
certification order that includes “a readily discernible, clear, 
and precise statement of the parameters defining the class or 
classes to be certified.”  Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian 
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Marcus stands for the proposition that ascertainability 
requires something more than a class capable of clear 
definition by a court; it requires that the class’s members be 
identifiable.  687 F.3d at 593 (“If class members are 
impossible to identify without extensive and individualized 
fact-finding or ‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is 
inappropriate.”).  However, Marcus involved a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class, and it is not clear that the reasons for requiring 
ascertainability are applicable here, where Shelton attempted 
to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) seeking only injunctive 
and declaratory relief.  
 
 Though classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 
23(b)(2) all proceed as “class actions,” the two subsections 
actually create two remarkably different litigation devices.  
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “the court finds that the questions 
of law or fact common to class members predominate over 
                                                 
1 We did not analyze ascertainability as an implied 
requirement of Rule 23(a), as some other courts have done.  
See Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 161 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Some courts have added an ‘implied 
requirement of ascertainability’ to the express requirements of 
Rule 23(a) . . . .” (citing In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. 
Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 2006))).  Instead, in Marcus 
we treated ascertainability as an implied requirement, the 
analysis of which preceded the Rule 23(a) analysis. Marcus, 
687 F.3d at 593.  This divergence illustrates another 
ambiguity of the ascertainability standard: the section of Rule 
23 from which it is implied.   
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any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly 
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”   Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(b)(3).  As compared to Rule 23(b)(2), Rule 23(b)(3) 
“allows class certification in a much wider set of 
circumstances” including those “in which class-action 
treatment is not as clearly called for.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Because a Rule 23(b)(3) class is 
such an “adventuresome innovation,” id., Congress included 
additional “procedural safeguards for (b)(3) class members 
beyond those provided for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members.”  
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432.  In addition to requiring 
predominance and superiority for such a class, Rule 23 
requires that potential class members be given the 
opportunity to opt-out, and that they receive “best notice that 
is practicable under the circumstances, including individual 
notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  
 
 In contrast, “[t]he key to the (b)(2) class is the 
‘indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy 
warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be 
enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class 
members or as to none of them.’”  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 
2557 (emphasis added) (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).  Because there is no right to opt out 
from such a class, and because significant individual issues 
in a (b)(2) class might present manageability issues and 
undermine the value of utilizing the class action mechanism, 
we have instructed that such classes must be cohesive.  See 
Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 
1998).  However, this requirement comes from Rule 23(b)(2) 
itself, not from any general requirement of ascertainability.  
Because the focus in a (b)(2) class is more heavily placed on 
the nature of the remedy sought, and because a remedy 
obtained by one member will naturally affect the others, the 
identities of individual class members are less critical in a 
(b)(2) action than in a (b)(3) action.  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2558 (“When a class seeks an indivisible injunction 
benefitting all its members at once, there is no reason to 
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undertake a case-specific inquiry into whether class issues 
predominate or whether class action is a superior method of 
adjudicating the dispute.”); Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143 n.18 
(“Injuries remedied through (b)(2) actions are really group, 
as opposed to individual injuries.” (citation omitted)).   
 
 Indeed, an Advisory Committee note to Rule 23 notes 
that “illustrative” examples of a Rule 23(b)(2) class “are 
various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is 
charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, 
usually one whose members are incapable of specific 
enumeration.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 
(1966) (emphasis added).  In light of this guidance, a 
judicially-created implied requirement of ascertainability—
that the members of the class be capable of specific 
enumeration— is inappropriate for (b)(2) classes.  Moreover, 
the enforcement of the remedy usually does not require 
individual identification of class members in (b)(2) class 
actions:  “If relief is granted . . . the defendants are legally 
obligated to comply, and it is usually unnecessary to define 
with precision the persons entitled to enforce compliance, 
since presumably at least the representative plaintiffs would 
be available to seek . . . relief if necessary.”  Rice v. City of 
Phila., 66 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1974).   
 
 Thus, it does not follow from our holding in Marcus 
that ascertainability is always a prerequisite to class 
certification.  In the context of a (b)(3) class, the requirement 
that the class be defined in a manner that allows ready 
identification of class members serves several important 
objectives that either do not exist or are not compelling in 
(b)(2) classes.2  See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 
                                                 
2  First, it eliminates serious administrative 
burdens that are incongruous with the 
efficiencies expected in a class action by 
insisting on the easy identification of class 
members. . . . Second, it protects absent class 
members by facilitating the best notice 
practicable . . . in a Rule 23(b)(3) action. . . .  
Third, it protects defendants by ensuring that 
those persons who will be bound by the final 
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307 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that ascertainability plays “key 
roles . . . as part of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action lawsuit”).  
The ascertainability requirement ensures that the procedural 
safeguards necessary for litigation as a (b)(3) class are met, 
but it need not (and should not) perform the same function in 
(b)(2) litigation.  See Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 
271 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Where . . . the class action seeks 
only injunctive or declaratory relief, for which the notice 
provision of [Rule] 23(c)(2) is not mandatory, the district 
court has even greater freedom in both the timing and 
specificity of its class definition.”). 
 
 Although this issue is a matter of first impression for 
us, some of our sister courts of appeals have addressed this 
issue and agree that it is improper to require ascertainability 
for a (b)(2) class.  The Courts of Appeals for the First and 
Tenth Circuits explicitly rejected an ascertainability 
requirement for Rule 23(b)(2) classes.  The court’s analysis in 
Shook v. El Paso County is particularly germane to our 
inquiry.  386 F.3d 963, 972 (10th Cir. 2004).  There, the court 
explained that “many courts have found Rule 23(b)(2) well 
suited for cases where the composition of the class is not 
readily ascertainable; for instance, in a case where the 
plaintiffs attempt to bring suit on behalf of a shifting prison 
population.”  Id. at 972.  Similarly, the First Circuit explained 
that a (b)(2) class definition need not be as precise as that of a 
(b)(3) class.  See Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st 
Cir. 1972) (holding that, because “notice to the members of a 
(b) (2) class is not required . . . the actual membership of the 
class need not . . . be precisely delimited”).  Both courts 
reasoned that the district courts erred in those cases by 
requiring ascertainability (or “identifiability”), which the 
courts noted was only applicable to Rule 23(b)(3) classes.  
See Shook, 386 F.3d at 972 (noting that the district court 
impermissibly “imported additional elements from Rule 
23(b)(3) into the (b)(2) analysis [including] identifiability”); 
Yaffe, 454 F.2d at 1366 (“[T]he [district] court applied 
                                                                                                             
judgment are clearly identifiable.  
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted); see also Hayes, 725 F.3d at 354-55. 
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standards applicable to a subdivision (b) (3) class rather than 
to a subdivision (b) (2) class.”).  
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also tied 
the ascertainability (or “precise class definition”) requirement 
to the procedural protections of Rule 23(b)(3), noting that 
“[s]ome courts have stated that a precise class definition is 
not as critical where certification of a class for injunctive or 
declaratory relief is sought under [R]ule 23(b)(2).”  In re 
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2004).  
However, the court clarified that, “[w]here notice and opt-out 
rights are requested [in a (b)(2) class action] . . . a precise 
class definition becomes just as important as in the [R]ule 
23(b)(3) context.”  Id.  There, plaintiffs sought a mix of 
injunctive relief and backpay.  Id.  Here, only injunctive and 
declaratory relief are sought.3 
 
 Other courts have certified very broadly-defined (b)(2) 
classes without explicitly discussing ascertainability.  For 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld 
the certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class that was probably 
unascertainable.  The class there included children currently 
in the custody of a city agency, those who would be in 
custody in the future, and even some children who should be 
                                                 
3 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has also 
discussed this issue, though its guidance is less clear.  It 
initially implied a “definiteness” requirement from Rule 23, 
but it held that “a class that satisfies all of the other 
requirements of Rule 23 will not be rejected as indefinite 
when its contours are defined by the defendants’ own 
conduct.”  Rochford, 565 F.2d at 978.  Subsequently, it 
clarified that Rochford’s “tolerance of a wildly indefinite 
class definition” is disfavored, Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. 
Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 496 (7th Cir. 2012), and it suggested an 
indefinite class may only be certified if its “members could be 
enumerated eventually.”  Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 
626 (7th Cir. 2008).  However, the classes in each of these 
more recent cases failed to meet the requirements of Rule 
23(a), and certification was inappropriate on that basis. See 
Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 496-97; Rahman, 530 F.3d at 627. 
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known to the city agency. See Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 
F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1997).4  In a recent case, a district 
court for the Southern District of New York explained that 
“[i]t would be illogical to require precise ascertainability in a 
suit that seeks no class damages. The general demarcations of 
the proposed class are clear . . . and that definition makes the 
class sufficiently ascertainable for the purpose of Rule 
23(b)(2).”  Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 172 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).  That court also noted that a number of 
other federal courts have certified unascertainable classes 
under Rule 23(b)(2).  See id. at 171-72 nn. 115-17 (collecting 
cases).5  Finally, we think it significant that the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of whether a class had been properly 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes lacks any inquiry into “ascertainability.”  131 S. Ct. at  
2557. 
 
 The nature of Rule 23(b)(2) actions, the Advisory 
Committee’s note on (b)(2) actions, and the practice of many 
of other federal courts all lead us to conclude that 
ascertainability is not a requirement for certification of a 
(b)(2) class seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief, 
such as the putative class here.  This does not suggest that we 
are jettisoning the basic requirement that “there must be a 
‘class’” in a class action.  See C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. 
Kane, supra § 1760.  Rather, we are merely holding that, for 
certification of a 23(b)(2) class seeking only declaratory or 
injunctive relief, a properly defined “class” is one that: (1) 
meets the requirements of Rule 23(a); (2) is sufficiently 
                                                 
4 That class was defined as “[a]ll children who are or will be 
in the custody of the New York City Administration for 
Children’s Services (“ACS”), and those children who, while 
not in the custody of ACS, are or will be at risk of neglect or 
abuse and whose status is or should be known to ACS.”  
Marisol A., 126 F.3d at 375. 
5 The district court in Floyd describes our decision in Baby 
Neal for and by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48 (3d Cir. 1994) as 
certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class that was “clearly 
unascertainable.”  Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 172 n.117.  It is 
important to note that we did not specifically address 
ascertainability in that case. 
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cohesive under Rule 23(b)(2) and our guidance in Barnes, 
161 F.3d at 143; and (3) is capable of the type of description 
by a “readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of the 
parameters defining the class,” as required by Rule 
23(c)(1)(B) and our discussion in Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 187.  
No additional requirements need be satisfied.  
 
B.  Class Definition 
 
 Shelton’s proposed class, when properly defined, is 
easily capable of the type of description demanded by Rule 
23(c)(1)(B).  As noted above, he seeks certification of a class 
consisting of  
 
[a]ll persons who are currently or will be imprisoned in 
the SMU program at USP Lewisburg.  The class 
period commences from the time of this filing, and 
continues so long as USP Lewisburg Officials and 
Corrections Officers persist in the unconstitutional 
patterns, practices, or policies of (1) placing hostile 
inmates together in cells or recreation cages, and 
enforcing this placement through the use of punitive 
restraints, and (2) failing to take any reasonable 
measures to protect the inmates from inmate-on-
inmate violence by hostile inmates.  
 
A A. 77.  The district court noted that Shelton proposed a 
class of “all persons who are currently or will be imprisoned 
in the [SMU] . . . .”  Shelton, 2012 WL 5250401, at *1.  For 
reasons that are not at all apparent, the district court 
improperly narrowed the class to inmates “placed with an 
inmate that prison officials knew, or should have known, 
posed a threat to that inmate[;]” inmates “housed with a 
hostile inmate [and] assaulted by the hostile inmate, and 
prison officials fail[ed] to intervene[;]” and “inmates who, 
pursuant to a prison practice, are placed in painful punitive 
restraints for refusing a dangerous cell assignment.”  Id. at 5-
6.  The court thereby imposed extra requirements requiring 
the very individualized, case-by-case determinations that the 
court then paradoxically ruled were fatal to class 
certification.  Though we have clarified that the type of 
ascertainability analysis performed by the district court is 
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inappropriate here, it is also important to note that the district 
court erred by narrowing the definition of the proposed class.   
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 It is difficult to understand why the district court 
redefined the proposed class in this manner.  Courts have 
discretionary authority to “reshape the boundaries and 
composition of the class,” but when they do so, “that action 
entails a determination that reformulating the class will better 
serve the purposes of Rule 23 and the underlying policies of 
the substantive law than would denying certification 
altogether.”  Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class 
Certification, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1897, 1925 (2014).  Here 
however, the court appears to have simply misinterpreted or 
misunderstood the class Shelton was proposing.  That resulted 
in a class definition that undermined, rather than served, the 
purposes of Rule 23 “and the underlying polices of the 
substantive law.”  See id.  Given the declaratory and 
injunctive relief that Shelton seeks, the narrowing of the 
requested class was neither necessary nor appropriate.   
 
 Common sense supports the assumption that the 
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) knows where inmates in a given 
institution are housed, and the defendants have offered 
nothing that would undermine that assumption or support a 
finding that the BOP would have trouble determining which 
inmates have been assigned to the SMU at USP-Lewisberg 
since the complaint was filed.  Accordingly, if Shelton has 
satisfied the other requirements of Rule 23, the district court 
should have no trouble describing the class as required by 
Rule 23(c)(1)(B) and, eventually, Rule 23(c)(3)(A).  Indeed, 
in the unlikely event that it becomes necessary to actually 
identify class members at some point during the litigation, the 
district court should be able to determine individual members 
based on the BOP’s own records. 
 
 The district court also erred in concluding that the 
class was overly broad because some putative class members 
have not yet suffered an injury.  See Shelton, 2012 WL 
5250401, at *5.  There is no requirement that every class 
member suffer an injury before a class is certifiable under 
Rule 23.  In fact, we have held to the contrary.  In Hassine v. 
Jeffes, we stated:  
 
Rule 23 does not require that the representative 
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plaintiff have endured precisely the same 
injuries that have been sustained by the class 
members, only that the harm complained of be 
common to the class, and that the named 
plaintiff demonstrate a personal interest or 
threat of injury that is real and immediate, not 
conjectural or hypothetical. 
 
846 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted) (second emphasis added).  
  
 This is particularly true in the context of a claim under 
the Eighth Amendment, which protects against the risk—not 
merely the manifestation—of harm.  As the Supreme Court 
has explained, “an inmate seeking an injunction to prevent a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment must show that prison 
officials are ‘knowingly and unreasonably disregarding an 
objectively intolerable risk of harm, and that they will 
continue to do so . . . into the future.’”  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. 
Ct. 1910, 1960 (2011) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 846 (1994)).  In Plata, prisoners with physical or mental 
illness challenged a state prison system’s medical care 
system.  In deciding the propriety of the remedy that had been 
granted to the prisoners, who comprised two separate Rule 23 
classes, the Court explained that “[p]risoners who are not sick 
or mentally ill do not yet have a claim that they have been 
subjected to care that violates the Eighth Amendment, but in 
no sense are they remote bystanders in [the state’s] medical 
care system.  They are that system’s next potential victims.”  
Id. at 1940.  There, as here, the focus was more on the 
defendants’ conduct and policies than on the individual 
identities or medical issues of each class member.  See id. 
(noting that “all prisoners in California are at risk so long as 
the State continues to provide inadequate care”).   
  
 We have instructed district courts to consider this 
aspect of Eighth Amendment claims when deciding whether 
the requirements of Rule 23 have been met at the class 
certification stage.  See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 157-
58 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a class of “inmates . . . [who] 
were either subject to actual skin infections, or were subject 
to the threat of future injury due to deliberate indifference on 
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the part of prison officials in failing to contain the contagion” 
should not fail for lack of typicality under Rule 23(a) because 
all class members were at least “subject to the threat of an 
injury”).  
  
 Thus, Shelton’s proposed class is not overbroad or 
improperly defined for purposes of Rule 23.  On remand, the 
district court must consider whether the properly-defined 
putative class meets the remaining Rule 23 requirements for 
class certification. 
 
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
 Shelton also appeals the district court’s entry of 
summary judgment in favor of defendants on his individual 
claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Eighth 
Amendment.6  We will first discuss the court’s failure to 
consider the declaration Shelton’s attorney filed under Fed R. 
Civ. P. 56(d) in opposition to summary judgment.    
 
A. Rule 56(d) 
 
 As we noted earlier, Shelton’s opposition to the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment included a 
declaration that his counsel submitted pursuant to Rule 56(d).  
According to that declaration, Shelton needed discovery in 
order to properly respond to the defendants’ summary 
judgment motion.  
 
“[I]t is well established that a court ‘is obliged to give 
a party opposing summary judgment an adequate opportunity 
to obtain discovery.’”  Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 
F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Dowling v. City of 
Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir. 1988)).  Rule 56(d) states 
that “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, 
                                                 
6 The district court’s order granting summary judgment to the 
defendants disposed of Shelton’s remaining claims and 
followed its order denying class certification.  See Shelton v. 
Bledsoe, No. 3:CV-11-1618, 2012 WL 5267034, at *8-9 
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2012). 
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for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to 
justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the 
motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or 
declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other 
appropriate order.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).  
 
Defendants rely on the non-precedential decision in 
Superior Offshore International, Inc. v. Bristow Group, Inc., 
490 F. App’x 492, 501 (3d Cir. 2012), to argue that Shelton 
was required to file a “motion” in order to seek relief under 
Rule 56(d).  The panel in Superior Offshore did state that “[a] 
Rule 56(d) motion is the proper recourse of a party faced with 
a motion for summary judgment who believes that additional 
discovery is necessary before he can adequately respond to 
that motion.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We have previously referred to items filed under 
Rule 56(d) as “motions.” See Murphy, 650 F.3d at 309-10.  
More pointedly, the panel in Doe v. Abington Friends School 
explained that, in responding to a motion for summary 
judgment, “if the non-moving party believes that additional 
discovery is necessary, the proper course is to file a motion . . 
. .”  480 F.3d at 257.  
 
However, we do not interpret these statements or our 
opinions in Murphy or Doe as actually requiring that an 
opposition under Rule 56(d) be registered in a motion to the 
court.  The unambiguous text of the Rule does not require an 
opposition on Rule 56(d) grounds to be formally styled as a 
motion.  Indeed, the text of the rule, Advisory Committee’s 
notes, our own precedent, and guidance from other circuit 
courts all indicate that a formal motion is not required by the 
Rule.  
 
Rule 56 sets forth the procedure for requesting and 
opposing summary judgment. It requires only that a party’s 
request for summary judgment be styled as a motion.  Rule 
56(a) provides: 
 
A party may move for summary judgment, 
identifying each claim or defense . . . on which 
summary judgment is sought.  The court shall 
grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
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that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  The court should 
state on the record the reasons for granting or 
denying the motion. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  The Rule specifically requires a 
“motion” to be filed, and it refers to the party requesting 
summary judgment as “the movant.”  However, no such 
language is used to refer to the party opposing summary 
judgment.  Rule 56(c) sets out the procedures that must be 
followed to oppose a motion for summary judgment.  It refers 
to the party opposing a summary judgment not as a “movant,” 
but merely as the “party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely 
disputed.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).  In describing the 
procedures that must be followed to obtain or oppose 
summary judgment, Rule 56(c) repeatedly refers to the initial 
request for summary judgment as a motion, but it requires 
only affidavits or declarations from the opposing party.7  
 
 The current dispute concerns the interpretation and 
application of Rule 56(d), which by its own terms applies 
only “When Facts are Unavailable to the Nonmovant.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(d).  The procedure by which the party opposing 
                                                 
7 Rather than requiring a motion to allege a factual dispute, 
Rule 56(c)(1) requires that the opposing party “must support 
the assertion [that a dispute of fact exists] by: (A) citing to 
particular parts of materials in the record, including 
depositions, [etc.]”  Subdivision (2) provides that “[a] party 
may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact 
cannot be [admitted into evidence.]”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).  
We do not interpret the reference to “a party” to require that 
the opponent to a summary judgment motion file an opposing 
motion.  Rather, it is clear from the context that the drafters 
used the term there for sake of simplicity and clarity.  Rule 
56(c)(3) only addresses what the reviewing court may 
consider and is not relevant to our inquiry.  Rule 56(c)(4) is 
entitled “Affidavits or Declarations.”  It provides that 
affidavits or declarations “used to support or oppose a motion 
must be made on personal knowledge, [and] set out facts that 
would be admissible in evidence.”  Id. (emphasis added.) 
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summary judgment submits an affidavit or declaration under 
Rule 56(d) supplants the procedure that would otherwise 
follow under Rule 56(c) if facts were available to the 
nonmovant.  See 10B C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Fed. 
Prac. & Proc. § 2740 (3d ed. 2005) (“[W]hen the movant has 
met the initial burden required for the granting of a summary 
judgment, the opposing party must either establish a genuine 
issue for trial . . . or explain why he cannot yet do so . . . .”).  
As was true with regards to Rule 56(c), it makes little sense to 
conclude that the drafters would refer to the party presenting 
such an affidavit or declaration as a “nonmovant” if they 
intended to require the affidavit or declaration to be presented 
by motion.  Moreover, the text of the Rule does not require 
that the party who opposes summary judgment by filing an 
affidavit or declaration must thereafter move for discovery.  
Rather, the Rule simply allows the court to respond to a Rule 
56(d) affidavit or declaration by “allow[ing] time . . . to take 
discovery.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).  Thus, no formal discovery 
motion is contemplated, and we decline to infer any such 
requirement. 
 
This was readily apparent in the phrasing of the Rule 
before the 2010 Amendments.  See St. Surin v. V.I. Daily 
News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 
cases that emphasize the requirement of an “affidavit”).  The 
Advisory Committee has explained that the Rules were 
amended “without substantial change.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), 
advisory committee’s note (2010).  Prior to the amendments, 
Rule 56(f), which became Rule 56(d), was captioned “When 
Affidavits are Unavailable.”  The Rule stated: “Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that 
[s/]he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his [or her] opposition, the court may 
refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions 
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just.”  Costlow v. United States, 552 F.2d 560, 563 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1997).  The old rule thus assumes that the party 
opposing summary judgment will file an affidavit, not a 
motion for discovery, in response to a summary judgment 
motion.  Furthermore, the 2010 Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure allow for alternatives to a formal 
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affidavit such as “a written unsworn declaration, certificate, 
verification, or statement subscribed in proper form as true 
under penalty of perjury.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, advisory 
committee’s note (2010). 
  
 Our holding that a formal motion is not required to 
request discovery under Rule 56 is consistent with the 
analysis of other circuit courts of appeals.  Although the 
request for discovery is sometimes—rather casually—
characterized as a “motion,” courts recognize that the 
nonmoving party can respond to a motion for summary 
judgment by filing an affidavit or declaration requesting 
discovery.  For example, before the current amendments to 
Rule 56 were enacted, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit stated that it was considering the denial of a Rule 
56(f) “motion,” but the opposition was actually an affidavit 
attached to the party’s response to the motion for summary 
judgment.  Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (10th 
Cir. 2006).  Other courts have followed similar practices.8  
                                                 
8 It is clear that many courts’ use of the word “motion” to 
refer to an opposition registered pursuant to Rule 56(d) is 
imprecise; affidavits and declarations are regularly demanded 
and accepted.  See Hicks v. Johnson, 755 F.3d 738, 743 (1st 
Cir. 2014) (referring to a “rule 56(d) motion” but explaining 
that “[t]o benefit from the protections of Rule 56(d), a litigant 
must ordinarily furnish the nisi prius court with a timely 
statement—if not by affidavit, then in some other 
authoritative manner” (citation omitted)); Toben v. 
Bridgestone Retail Operations, LLC, 751 F.3d 888, 894-95 
(8th Cir. 2014) (considering a properly submitted affidavit 
under Rule 56(d), but referring to it as a “motion”); In re 
World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 
758 F.3d 202, 212 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]o the extent that 
plaintiffs needed additional time for discovery, they failed to 
file an affidavit pursuant to [Rule] 56(d).”); Nguyen v. CNA 
Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[A] party may not 
simply assert in its brief that discovery was necessary and 
thereby overturn summary judgment when it failed to comply 
with the requirement . . . to set out reasons for the need for 
discovery in an affidavit.” (citation omitted)).  
 
 
23 
 Thus, nothing precludes a party from requesting an 
opportunity for discovery under Rule 56(d) by simply 
attaching an appropriate affidavit or declaration to that party’s 
response to a motion for summary judgment, and by asserting 
that summary judgment should not be granted without 
affording the responding nonmovant an opportunity for 
discovery.  Moreover, we note that district courts usually 
grant properly filed requests for discovery under Rule 56(d) 
“as a matter of course,” whether the nonmovant’s response to 
a summary judgment motion is characterized as a motion, 
affidavit, or declaration.  Murphy, 650 F.3d at 309-10 
(quoting Doe, 480 F.3d at 257); cf. Mid-South Grizzlies v. 
Nat’l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1983).  
This is particularly true when there are discovery requests 
outstanding or where relevant facts are under control of the 
party moving for summary judgment.  Murphy, 650 F.3d at 
310.   
  
 If discovery is incomplete, a district court is rarely 
justified in granting summary judgment, unless the discovery 
request pertains to facts that are not material to the moving 
party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.  Doe, 480 
F.3d at 257.  Summary judgment may also be granted if the 
Rule 56(d) declaration is inadequate.  See Koplove v. Ford 
Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding the 
affidavit insufficient because it did not specify what 
discovery was needed or why it had not previously been 
secured).  An adequate affidavit or declaration specifies 
“what particular information that is sought; how, if disclosed, 
it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not 
been previously obtained.”  Dowling, 855 F.2d at 140 (citing 
Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 229-30 (3d Cir. 
1987)).  
  
 Here, the district court granted summary judgment to 
the defendants without even considering the declaration that 
Shelton’s attorney filed in response to defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.  This was an abuse of discretion.   
Accordingly, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment 
and remand so that the district court may consider counsel’s 
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declaration regarding the need for discovery.9   
 
B. FTCA Exhaustion 
 
 Regardless of whether Shelton’s Rule 56(d) 
declaration justifies discovery in advance of the court’s ruling 
on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, it is clear that, 
because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies, 
Shelton cannot establish a claim for negligence under the 
FTCA based on the purported incident in November 2009. 
 
 No claim can be brought under the FTCA unless the 
plaintiff first presents the claim to the appropriate federal 
agency and the agency renders a final decision on the claim.  
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 
U.S. 106, 112 (1993); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 
1091 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A] claimant must have first presented 
the claim, in writing and within two years after its accrual, to 
the appropriate federal agency, and the claim must have been 
denied.”).  This requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be 
waived.  Rosario v. Am. Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 
F.2d 1227, 1231 (3d Cir. 1976).   
 
 Here, defendants supported their motion to dismiss 
and/or for summary judgment on Shelton’s FTCA claim with 
a declaration from Mike Romano, agency counsel for the 
BOP.  Romano stated that, based upon his search of the 
administrative claims database of the BOP, Shelton had not 
filed an administrative tort claim regarding any incident on 
November 26, 2009.  Romano did, however, confirm that 
Shelton had filed seven tort claims regarding other incidents 
in 2009 and 2011.  Shelton’s only response to this declaration 
                                                 
9 To the extent the district court did not address the parties’ 
arguments as to the defendants’ motion to seal documents, the 
district court can consider whether the documents should be 
sealed on remand.  The court’s inquiry should take into 
consideration the amount of time that has passed since the 
documents were originally filed and whether the institutional 
concerns that may have initially justified sealing are still 
sufficient to prevent Shelton from examining those 
documents.  
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was his insistence that he needed discovery to prove that he 
had filed an administrative tort claim.  Shelton further argues 
in a letter to this court that his complaint alleges that he 
exhausted his remedies as to the November 26, 2009 incident.  
He claims that allegation is sufficient because he needs 
discovery to “bolster” his claim that he has appropriately 
exhausted this claim.  However, his argument ignores the fact 
that the government has already produced the relevant 
discovery.  The government’s evidence establishes that 
Shelton did not exhaust, and Shelton does not explain how 
any additional discovery could refute the finding that he 
failed to exhaust any claim arising from a November 26, 2009 
incident. 
 
 The district court correctly found Shelton’s reply 
inadequate and held that Romano’s declaration was sufficient 
to establish that Shelton had not exhausted any claim arising 
from the alleged incident on November 26, 2009.  
Accordingly, the court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the FTCA claim based on its conclusion that 
Shelton’s failure to exhaust deprived the court of jurisdiction 
to hear that claim.  We agree.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the district court’s finding that it had no jurisdiction to hear 
Shelton’s FTCA claim. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order 
denying Shelton’s motion for class certification and the order 
granting summary judgment to defendants on Shelton’s 
Eighth Amendment claims.  We will remand for the district 
court to consider both issues in a manner consistent with this 
opinion.  We will affirm the district court’s dismissal of 
Shelton’s FTCA claim.  
 
   
 
